This article analyzes the diplomatic struggle during the early stages of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in early 1935. It is noted that the Ethiopian government at this time sought to elevate the resolution of the conflict to an international level within the League of Nations; however, Britain and France effectively supported Italy in its desire to keep discussions at the level of bilateral negotiations. The outcome of these negotiations was the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement on March 4, 1935, which aimed to establish a neutral zone in the disputed Ogaden region, ultimately never coming into force. It is demonstrated that Italy primarily aimed to buy time to assemble a military force in East Africa sufficient to initiate war against Ethiopia, with negotiations serving this purpose from the Italian perspective. The article argues that Italy actively opposed the internationalization of the conflict and successfully delayed Ethiopia's appeal to the League of Nations by two months. It reveals that during this period, Italy consistently built up its military presence in Eritrea and Somalia, anticipating a forthcoming war against Ethiopia. It is shown that at this stage, Italy achieved its objective by creating conditions conducive to planning an invasion of Ethiopia.
Т. П. Нестерова (Tue,) studied this question.