This essay draws on the writings of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, whose works have laid the foundation for modern warfare theory, to analyze the extent to which logistics were responsible for the failure of the German Ardennes Offensive of 1944-45. I will first discuss and define what I mean by “logistics” in this context before moving on to a relevant literature review drawing from Sun and Clausewitz. I will then contextualize the general situation of the German side in 1944, the general planning of the offensive as well as its execution. Next, I will analyze this event as a case study, systematically addressing the direct impacts of logistical shortcomings and exploring how classical theories fit into this decidedly modern battle. Lastly, I conclude by arguing that the German failure in logistics decisively contributed to the Ardennes Offensive’s collapse before examining the operation through the lens of classical theories to determine the validity of German actions as well as how they might have been improved.
Jiawei Huang (Fri,) studied this question.