Abstract In what sense can human beings be conceived of as social beings? I argue that sociality is not merely an attribute of the species to which we belong; rather, the way in which we belong to our own life-form is itself socially mediated. To bring this other sense of sociality into view, the article (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The political sociality characterizing human beings requires a complex second-personal articulation through which alone we can exist as members of our life-form and determine its content. (III) Constituted in this way, the human form of life is characterized by a particularly open and at the same time precarious character. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of particular second-personal recognitions, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalizing and individualizing our access to it.
Thomas Khurana (Tue,) studied this question.