The article proves that the term “Descartes’ medicine” is appropriate to denote a “useful science” that had to be created. During his lifetime, Descartes never began to create it. Therefore, none of his works (both published and drafts) can be called “medical texts” in an indirect sense. I argue with the thesis of Fabrizio Baldassarri, who calls the treatises L’Homme and La Description du corps humain such texts. I criticize contemporary works on Descartes’ “medicine” or “medical philosophy” (interpreted as independent branches of Descartes’ research) for their methodological unsoundness. Based on Descartes’ classification of sciences and on his “order” of 1647 research program, I argue that there is no reason to speak of Descartes’ properly “medical” explorations. Descartes’ studies of anatomy and physiology are a legitimate part of his “physics,” not “medicine,” although they are referred to the latter. I also identify three meanings of the term “medicine” in Descartes’ texts, arguing that none of them gives grounds for considering L’Homme and La Description du corps humain as “medical texts” in the Cartesian sense.
Oleg Khoma (2025) studied this question.