Designing secure electronic voting systems that truly protect voter privacy, ensure vote accuracy, and allow independent verification continues to pose serious difficulties. Many current cryptographic approaches require excessive computational resources and use encryption keys that are too large for practical implementation. This paper proposes modifications to the Chaum, Pedersen and Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmakers, and Yung voting protocols by integrating elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which offers stronger security per bit and more compact key representations. The use of ECC allows for reduced parameter sizes while maintaining resistance against known attacks, including those targeting the discrete logarithm problem. We present detailed adaptations of these protocols on elliptic curves and demonstrate how they preserve core security properties such as vote secrecy, universal verifiability, and resistance to double voting under a more efficient cryptographic framework. Our findings contribute to the development of scalable, high-assurance e-voting mechanisms suitable for modern digital infrastructures. The presented modifications significantly enhance the scalability and efficiency of e-voting systems without compromising cryptographic strength.
Turusbekova et al. (Tue,) studied this question.