Conceptual History of Human Dignity from a Functional Perspective

This study aims to provide a theoretical foundation for understanding the normative significance and practical implications of the concept of human dignity in contemporary constitutional and social contexts by re-examining its historical development through a functional perspective. While human dignity is widely recognized as the supreme principle of constitutional law in modern democratic states, the specific content and normative functions of this concept remain underexplored. Accordingly, this research analyzes the practical roles and normative functions that human dignity has performed across different historical and intellectual contexts, demonstrating that the concept has operated concretely within various historical frameworks rather than existing merely as an abstract declaration. Human dignity is a historically constructed concept that has evolved through ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, medieval Christian theology, early modern natural law theory, Kantian philosophy, and modern existentialism and critical theory. Specifically, in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, human dignity served to justify the unique status and public honor of humans as rational beings. In medieval Christian theology, it expressed the sanctity of humans as imago Dei (the image of God). In early modern natural law theory and Kantian philosophy, it functioned as the philosophical foundation for individual freedom and rights. In modern existentialism and critical theory, it has served as a reference point for the critique of technological alienation, totalitarianism, and human rights violations. In the aftermath of World War II, the devastation of the war and the imperative to establish a new constitutional order led to the recognition of the inviolable value of human dignity at the constitutional level. Notably, the German Basic Law enshrines human dignity as the highest constitutional value, obliging all legislative, administrative, and judicial actions of the state to respect and protect it. However, human dignity has been criticized for its polysemic nature, which allows for varying interpretations depending on specific historical or social contexts, thereby complicating the establishment of unified legal standards. To address these criticisms, this study underscores the necessity of reinterpreting and systematizing the concrete content of human dignity in modern contexts and developing normative criteria that can be practically applied to real-world cases. Furthermore, human dignity must serve as a critical benchmark for addressing emerging challenges in contemporary society, such as advancements in artificial intelligence and biotechnology, climate change, and environmental crises. This functional analysis of the historical development of human dignity provides important insights for addressing contemporary challenges to human dignity while maintaining its fundamental normative significance.