This study examines the complex and evolving nature of civil-military relations in Turkey, focusing particularly on the 1960 military coup. The article analyzes five main theoretical frameworks—Huntington's Institutional Distinction Theory, Janowitz's Professional Soldier Theory, Schiff's Concordance Theory, Feaver's Principal-Agent Model, and Bland's Shared Responsibility Theory—and applies them to the Turkish context. Each theory offers a distinct lens for understanding how political authority, military loyalty, institutional control, and cultural alignment shape the nature of military involvement in politics. The case of Turkey, with its unique historical and ideological structure, reveals that these theories—mostly developed for Western democracies—are insufficient in fully explaining military interventions like the 1960 coup. The article argues that a multifaceted approach is necessary, one that accounts not only for institutional mechanisms but also for ideological, cultural, and historical dynamics. Ultimately, the study emphasizes the need for democratic consolidation through inclusive governance, mutual institutional respect, and public acceptance of military reform
Senemoğlu et al. (Thu,) studied this question.