This article explores the relationship between human suffering and the limits of language, positing that suffering is not simply an experience of physical pain or emotional distress but a fracture in the capacity to articulate meaning. It clearly distinguishes between pain (a localised sensory experience that is potentially communicable) and suffering (an existential experience that involves a rupture of the symbolic order). It is argued that suffering appears when personal narrative is interrupted or becomes incoherent, provoking what is termed a ‘collapse of language’—moments when experience exceeds the expressive and symbolic capacity of the subject. This phenomenon is examined from multiple perspectives: the phenomenology of the body, philosophies of the limit (Lévinas, Derrida, Ricoeur) and clinical cases such as trauma, dementia and the diagnosis of serious illnesses. The text criticises the traditional definition of suffering proposed by Eric Cassell for presupposing a narrative self-consciousness, excluding prelinguistic or non-narrative forms of suffering. The text also tackles the issue of epistemic injustice in clinical contexts, where individuals discredit or lack conceptual resources to articulate their experiences of suffering. Finally, the article suggests an ethics of care that involves being open to what cannot be fully expressed, understanding that truly responding to suffering means not just trying to understand it completely or get rid of it, but being there in that difficult space where words fall short, while still providing human presence as support.
Esparza et al. (Wed,) studied this question.