Isolation, Public Opinion, and the Limits of British Policy in the Near East: Salisbury’s Anglo-Russian Condominium Attempt

During his three terms as Prime Minister of Britain, Salisbury also served concurrently as Foreign Secretary, exerting decisive influence over foreign policy. Although unsympathetic toward Sultan Abdulhamid II and inclined to the view that the Turks should withdraw from Europe, he nevertheless sought to preserve Britain’s traditional policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire. Salisbury feared that the Empire’s collapse would allow Russia to advance toward the Straits, undermining Britain’s international standing, particularly its prestige in India. For this reason, maintaining the status quo in the Near East appeared the most viable policy. Yet the Armenian disturbances in 1895 destabilized this balance, forcing Salisbury to deter Russia from exploiting the turmoil while addressing mounting public pressure at home. Although he contemplated sending the British fleet to the Straits, the Admiralty opposed such action. Reports of alleged harsh measures during the suppression of the uprisings inflamed British opinion, making a pro-Ottoman stance politically untenable. Consequently, Salisbury sought to manage domestic discontent through a more critical approach toward the Ottoman Empire while safeguarding British interests. By the end of 1895, however, he recognized that Britain’s objectives in the region could not be secured without Russian cooperation. Despite its significance, this episode has not been systematically examined in the literature, which has focused mainly on the Armenian Question or broader Anglo-Russian rivalry. Based on British Foreign Office documents, supported by secondary scholarship, this article examines the context, motivations, and limitations of Salisbury’s attempt to establish a joint Anglo-Russian condominium over the Ottoman Empire. It argues that the initiative’s failure not only reflected the constraints of British isolationism but also marked a turning point in Britain’s Near Eastern policy at the close of the nineteenth century. In doing so, the study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between humanitarian concerns, public opinion, and great power diplomacy in the late Ottoman context.