This paper presents a theoretical analysis of escalating naval competition between India and Pakistan against the backdrop of South Asia's security dynamics. Drawing on a structural realist framework, India's maritime strategy is examined in terms of Offensive Realism and its naval expansion and power projection as a rational attempt to pursue hegemony in the region. In contrast, Pakistan’s response is assessed via the Balance of Power theory, which modifies this asymmetric balancing relationship and is based on India’s relative sea-denial capabilities and strategic equation with China. This research highlights the emergence of "cascading security dilemma,” in which India's naval build-up, which has been primarily in response to counter China, is being correspondingly viewed by Pakistan as posing an existential threat and accelerating an Indo-Pakistani naval arms race. The destabilizing aspect of this competition is central to the nuclearization of the maritime domain. India’s deployment of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and Pakistan’s development of nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on conventional submarines produce deep asymmetries. This imbalance creates an "entanglement problem,” in which traditional naval engagements may be misinterpreted as strategic nuclear strikes, greatly increasing the potential for inadvertent nuclear escalation. This study concludes that these dynamics have turned the maritime arena into the most volatile flashpoint for future conflict in South Asia.
Farooq et al. (Sun,) studied this question.
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