Emergency Law as a Tool of Executive Centralization in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam

Emergency laws are often framed as necessary tools to respond quickly during national crises, but they also present significant risks to democratic structures. This paper explores how emergency powers can be used to centralize executive authority in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The purpose of this study is to analyze how legal frameworks enable or fail to restrict executive power during emergencies. Using a doctrinal legal research method, the paper examines constitutional texts, relevant statutes, and key political events to assess how emergency powers function in practice. Findings show that while all three countries demonstrate varying degrees of executive flexibility, Indonesia stands out due to its lack of clear legal limits and minimal oversight, while Thailand is riddled with normative inconsistencies and multiple avenues for its executive branch to weaponize the state of emergency. Vietnam, on the other hand, subordinates all branches of state power to the overarching control of the Communist Party, resulting in possible limited legal accountability and significant potential for unchecked executive action. The study emphasizes the need for stronger legal safeguards to prevent emergency powers from becoming a lasting feature of governance.