Intervention through Elite Competition: Interpreting the Gulf States’ Engagement with Iraq, 2003–23

The engagement of Gulf Cooperation Council states with Iraq has been heavily criticized by the literature, arguing that it is incoherent and lacks a long-term perspective. This article argues that this evaluation is due to an inadequate analytical framework and proposes a viewpoint that builds on the particular attributes of the Iraqi state and the competition between elites taking place in the country. In this vein, it argues that the strategy of the GCC states towards Iraq has been driven by their perception of elite-level competition in Iraq, the strength of support behind the elites, and their level iof homogeneity. Before 2014, the political circumstances undermined the GCC states' attempt to build political influence in the country. However, after the fall of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, the intensifying protest movement and the fragmentation of traditional elites incentivised the GCC states to move beyond a sectarian approach and build up a more comprehensive strategy. Applying the lens of elite competition not only helps us interpret the GCC states' activity and learning process in Iraq, but also shows, more generally, the utility of focusing on elite-level interactions.