Why do governments prevent crime in some places while neglecting others? Crime prevention policies are often seen as too slow, diffuse, and politically intangible to yield electoral benefits. When implemented, existing research suggests they primarily serve to reward co-partisans or mobilize ideologically aligned voters. This study challenges that view, showing that incumbents prioritize crime prevention in electorally competitive municipalities —where they narrowly won or lost— rather than responding to crime levels or rewarding loyal voters. Using fixed-effects models, matching techniques, and a difference-in-differences approach, I show that these targeted investments effectively increase vote shares for the right-wing incumbent president’s candidate in a subsequent election. Drawing on project-level data from Colombia and interviews with policymakers, this paper reveals that crime prevention policies, far from being politically inconsequential, function as a strategic and electorally effective tool.
Juan David Gélvez (Wed,) studied this question.