Reason in tranquility: Hume's critique of superstition

Abstract This paper examines a tension in Hume's philosophy between his epistemic critique of superstition and his naturalistic epistemology. While Hume faults superstition for its epistemic flaws, naturalistic interpretations often claim that he evaluates reasoning by its psychological force, such as liveliness or irresistibility. This raises a challenge: if superstitious reasoning stems from standard psychological processes and exhibits psychological strength, how can it be epistemically discredited? I argue that Hume's notion of good reasoning involves more than psychological force. He appeals to calm passions as an additional normative standard. Calm passions arise in response to epistemic factors, particularly certainty, whereas superstitious reasoning provokes violent passions through its uncertainty. Importantly, however, calmness does not require absolute certainty, and it marks a moderate and attainable level of epistemic commitment—one that enables inquiry while resisting the violent agitation characteristic of both superstition and radical skepticism.