In the judicial field of death penalty application, the expression of public opinion often falls into a theoretical dilemma due to being accused of "emotionality" and "irrationality". Its tension with the principle of judicial independence is also regarded as the core crux inducing the risk of "trial by public opinion". Existing studies mostly attribute the public's support for the death penalty to deep-rooted retributive concepts or irrational obsession with punishment, but fail to explore its structural roots. Taking landmark death penalty cases in the Chinese context (such as the Liu Yong case and the Li Changkui case) as analytical samples, this paper attempts to reveal that the opinions expressed by the public on the death penalty are, in essence, an externalized and concrete reflection of the inadequacies in the rationality of the current institutional arrangements and judicial procedures. The study argues that we should go beyond simple moral judgments or emotional attribution of the superficial aspects of public opinion, and shift the focus of examination from disputes over specific judicial decisions to more fundamental political institutional frameworks and spaces for procedural justice. Through this path, the aim is to reconstruct the jurisprudential basis for the expression of public opiniontransforming it from an irrational product regarded as "emotional venting" to rational communication and institutional response based on "rights discourse", thereby providing a more constructive theoretical framework and practical approach for reconciling the tension between judicial independence and public concern.
Peilin Ma (Wed,) studied this question.