Exploring the limits of the de jure Brussels Effect: competition law adoption in India, Singapore, and Ecuador

The theory of the de jure Brussels Effect offers a compelling account of international regulatory convergence. Foreign firms' exposure to stringent EU rules creates asymmetric regulatory costs vis-à-vis domestic competitors, triggering lobbying to level the domestic playing field, and ultimately leading to external Europeanisation. But is this elegant theory verified empirically? To test this, I first present a replicable testing framework grounded in process-tracing, and then apply it to three cases of competition law adoption that have previously been cited as supportive evidence: India, Singapore, and Ecuador. Surprisingly, in each case two or more necessary conditions are unmet, breaking the causal chain. The failure of the theory in these cases helps clarify its scope conditions, both functionally and geographically. Of course, as with all case studies, the external validity of these findings is debatable. Therefore, further work is needed to clarify the theory's boundaries across additional cases and domains.