The article examines the party "purge" that took place in December 1929 in the institution that was most responsible for the implementation of the new economic policy – the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR (NKF). The most qualified specialists concentrated here, who tried to combine market mechanisms with a team management style without prejudice to the economy. The People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR employed many people who were related to finance in one way or another in pre-revolutionary Russia. They were the first to be fired after the purge of the state apparatus. The party purges were different. The question of social origin was not raised here, the party commissions dealt with the ideological fluctuations of party members, and any deviation from the general line of the CPSU(b) could influence the party's decision. The literature did not pay attention to the fact that the most important departments of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR were headed by people from the Bund Party. One of these departments, Gosfincontrol, was headed by the head of the Bund party from 1917 to 1921, Aron Isakovich Weinstein. The management of state taxes was headed by M. O. Lifshits, the actual management of the Planning and Economic Management of the People's Commissariat was carried out by L. G. Shanin-Shapiro. In addition, there were many people in the People's Commissariat who did not achieve much success in the administrative part, but also joined this institution, having been a member of the Bund Party in the past. Belonging to this party was not the reason for the compromise, but everyone who was concerned about these issues tried to somehow justify themselves. There was no outright anti-Semitism, but all three chief executives of the departments, despite their outstanding managerial qualities, were dismissed. They had to be replaced by less qualified staff to carry out any orders from the authorities. The return from the NEP to the practice of "war communism" led to a significant decrease in the intellectual level of the NKF of the USSR. In a certain sense, this demotion was specifically achieved by introducing "nominees" into the People's Commissariat, who, as experience has shown, could not fully replace those who were dismissed.
Andrey L. Yurganov (Wed,) studied this question.