The article examines the main perspectives on planning target identification during the preparation and conduction joint fire support in a combined arms brigade according to NATO standards. The challenges facing the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the modern armed conflicts conditions are analyzed, and ways to improve the planning process of target identification are proposed. Particular attention is draw to NATO standards integration, the information and communication systems development, and the personnel training. In modern conditions, a combined arms brigade faces a number of challenges that complicate both combat planning and available firepower use. First of all, this is due to the large number of various units within the brigade (mechanized, tank, artillery, air defense, engineering, etc.) and the need for their operational interaction on the battlefield. In addition, decision-making speed becomes crucial in a dynamic environment, when the time from target detection to opening fire is significantly reduced. The planning process for determining objectives within the joint fire support (JFS) framework begins with a detailed situation analysis, which involves assessing the enemy's forces and one's own capabilities. At this stage, it is critically important to obtain the most reliable intelligence information from various sources: aerial reconnaissance by unmanned aerial vehicles, space reconnaissance, artillery and electronic reconnaissance, data from special forces units, etc. Given the tight response time, the combined arms brigade must have a coordinated system for processing and distributing intelligence data so that commanders at all levels (especially artillery units) can receive real-time information about the location and nature of the enemy's actions. The second defining component is the analytical process of assessing the importance, vulnerability and targets priority, which in NATO doctrines is often implemented on the “CARVER” matrix basis. The commander and his staff, in cooperation with specialists from the brigade's JFS department (section), as well as officers from the intelligence and operational planning unit, determine which targets are the most critical for the enemy (for example, command posts, communication systems, logistics nodes, and artillery firing position), how accessible they are to attack, and what resources are needed to ensure maximum effect.
Batalov et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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