Abstract This paper explores Christian August Crusius’ critique of the ‘Best of All Possible Worlds’ (BPW) theory, primarily associated with Leibniz and Wolff, as presented in his Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten . The analysis begins by summarizing the BPW theory and its distinctive treatments by Leibniz, Wolff, and Crusius. The core of the paper examines three strands of Crusius’ critique. First (C1), Crusius challenges the BPW’s coherence, arguing that worlds cannot exhibit absolute perfection due to the inexhaustible possibilities of greater perfection. Second (C2), Crusius contends that even if a ‘best world’ exists, its identification is inherently unprovable, given the indifference of means to divine ends. Finally (C3), Crusius reconceptualizes possible worlds as flexible, dynamic systems shaped by free agents, thereby rendering the static BPW model untenable. This paper evaluates Crusius’ arguments against both Leibnizian and Wolffian systems, highlighting Crusius’ innovations in modal metaphysics and his commitment to divine and creaturely freedom.
Jon Bornholdt (Mon,) studied this question.