In science as elsewhere, attention is a limited resource and scientists compete with one another to produce the most exciting, novel and impactful results. We develop a game-theoretic model to explore how such competition influences the degree of risk that scientists are willing to embrace in their research endeavors. We find that competition for scarce resources -- for example, publications in elite journals, prestigious prizes, and faculty jobs -- motivates scientific risk-taking and may be important in counterbalancing other incentives that favor cautious, incremental science. Even small amounts of competition induce substantial risk-taking. Moreover, we find that in an ``opt-in'' contest, increasing the stakes induces increased participation -- which crowds the contest and further impels entrants to pursue higher-risk, higher-return investigations. The model also illuminates a source of tension in academic training and collaboration. Researchers at different career stages differ in their need to amass accomplishments that distinguish them from their peers, and therefore may not agree on what degree of risk to accept.
Gross et al. (Mon,) studied this question.