Sedition laws in India have always been a matter of controversy, largely due to their colonial origins and misuse against political dissent. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), introduced by the British in 1870, criminalized speech or expression that brought “disaffection” against the government. Over the years, this provision was widely criticized for curbing free speech and being misapplied against journalists, activists, and citizens who merely questioned those in power. The Supreme Court, while upholding its constitutionality in Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), limited its application to acts inciting violence or public disorder. Yet, its misuse persisted. With the introduction of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, the government repealed Section 124A, signaling the apparent end of sedition law. However, its replacement, Section 152 of the BNS, has raised concerns of being “old wine in a new bottle.” This section penalizes acts that endanger the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, including subversive speech. Critics argue that the language remains vague, retaining potential for misuse similar to the colonial law. While the government claims it provides stronger safeguards and focuses on threats to national security, skeptics fear it could still target dissent under the guise of protecting integrity. Thus, while the terminology has shifted, the essence of sedition survives. Unless clearly distinguished from legitimate criticism of the government, the BNS risks continuing the legacy of colonial suppression, making the promise of reform appear cosmetic rather than substantive.
DEBNATH et al. (Tue,) studied this question.