The object of this research is the Armenian politico-military governance systemduring the Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict, while the subject is the specific featuresof its formation and manifestation as seen in the example of the Kapan self-defenseoperation. The aim of the research, pursued through the method of qualitative contentanalysis, is to reveal the particularities of the formation of Armenia's politico-militarygovernance system using this operation as a turning point.The relevance of this article is determined by two main factors. First, it contributesto the academic field devoted to the study of the Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict byfocusing on a specific historical episode that has not yet received coverage in scholarlyliterature. Second, the article has practical significance in terms of the reproducibility ofthe "social technology" of forming and operating systems of politico-military governanceunder crisis conditions. The article's relevance is further underscored by the fact that bothduring the period under study (1992) and at the time of writing, the de facto frontlinebetween Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Kapan region and the eastern part of Syunikremains identical in configuration, lending additional politico-military significance to thetopic.The scholarly novelty of the article lies in the fact that the Kapan self-defenseoperation is for the first time made the subject of a standalone academic study and isexamined not in isolation, but in the broader politico-military context of the correspondingphase of the war.Among the key conclusions is the finding that the Kapan operation marked aturning point not only at the operational level in this segment of the front but also in theoverall political-strategic paradigm of war organization, seizing the initiative and themonopoly of determining the geography of offensive actions from the Azerbaijani side.
Edgar Elbakyan (Wed,) studied this question.