Abstract Objectives/Scope This paper aims to examine the overreliance on artificial intelligence in energy sector cybersecurity and the risks introduced by treating AI tools as infallible. It explores the boundaries of current AI detection systems and evaluates how assumptions of accuracy may compromise operational integrity, forensic accountability, and critical incident response in complex energy infrastructure. Methods, Procedures, Process The approach is based on comparative workflow audits involving AI-driven cybersecurity implementations within energy organisations. A technical review of failure points is integrated with governance analysis, focusing on how decision-making and responsibility are distributed among AI vendors, IT teams, and senior leadership. A layered methodology is employed, combining forensic examination of alert suppression, system bypasses, and false negatives with a procedural audit of internal response protocols. The study also considers legal interpretations of AI-triggered control failures, particularly in the absence of reproducible digital trails or human interpretability. Results, Observations, Conclusions The findings indicate that current AI-enabled cybersecurity systems, although operationally capable of anomaly classification, suffer from structural opacity, particularly in the absence of reproducible inference logging and state preservation. Suppression mechanisms discard decisions silently, preventing forensic reconstruction and undermining post-incident accountability. Operator desensitisation to false alerts, coupled with threshold misconfiguration, leads to the rejection of genuine threats without a traceable rationale. Reviewed systems frequently lacked real-time oversight, model state journaling, and override documentation, rendering compliance artefacts incomplete. This study demonstrates that reliance on unverified machine scoring creates a false sense of control, calling for a re-engineered governance model with enforced traceability, deterministic escalation protocols, and embedded human interpretive checkpoints. Novel/Additive Information This research formalises AI traceability as a forensic and procedural requirement in cybersecurity operations, framing it as essential for control validation, incident reconstruction, and audit integrity. It introduces a governance model in which AI is repositioned as a constrained probabilistic agent rather than a standalone control authority. The proposed architecture incorporates decision-state logging, transparency in suppression, and embedded human oversight, establishing a structured interface between algorithmic inference and institutional accountability within security-critical infrastructure.
Alessio Faccia (Mon,) studied this question.
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