Live-streaming e-commerce is a popular promotional method for attracting more customers in the era of the platform economy. This study investigates a better strategy for live-streaming sales for a manufacturer in an e-platform-based supply chain. Specifically, the manufacturer has two options—self-broadcasting or key opinion leader (KOL) live-streaming—to sell products on the e-platform, which acts as a reseller and agency seller in the dual-channel supply chain. We established three Stackelberg models for the supply chain and derived the equilibrium decisions and profits of supply-chain members under three scenarios: without live-streaming, KOL live-streaming, and manufacturer self-broadcasting. After a comparative analysis, we obtained the following key results: First, even if the influence level of the KOL is within a low range, the manufacturer should change the strategy from no live-streaming e-commerce to KOL live-streaming, with a decrease in the agency fee charged from the e-platform. However, with the continued decline in agency fee, the manufacturer should change the strategy from KOL live-streaming to self-broadcasting. Furthermore, we found a win–win zone such that both supply-chain members are better off under the KOL scenario when both the agency fee of the e-platform and the influence level of the KOL are in higher ranges. Our study not only provides a theoretical basis for the enterprise to choose the appropriate live-streaming mode but also helps it to further increase profits and reduce operational risks. In the future, we will further incorporate theoretical analyses into empirical study to discover more interesting results.
Yang et al. (Mon,) studied this question.