The right to seek compensation for damages arising from conduct that constitutes a violation of competition rules was introduced relatively early in Serbian law, in 2009, through Article 73 of the Competition Protection Act. However, more than a decade later, no cases have been brought before the domestic courts. This absence of proceedings largely stems from the specific nature of cartel damages, the peculiarities of competition law enforcement, and the absence of an effective collective redress mechanism. The first legislative attempt to provide for such a mechanism in the Civil Procedure Act was declared unconstitutional. Since then, the Serbian market has become increasingly monopolized by the "big players," leaving consumers and end users with little recourse other than pursuing individual claims against cartels. Such claims, however, face significant obstacles, including difficulties in gathering evidence, quantifying damages, and disproportionate litigation costs relative to the harm suffered. The author argues that, without effective collective redress mechanism, the enforcement of competition law in Serbia cannot be considered fully consistent with EU standards. Germany is used as a benchmark due to its well-developed collective redress framework, which allows the exercise of the right to compensation through the assignment of claims to a qualified entity and represents one of the leading approaches in European practice. In light of the absence of a comparable mechanism in domestic legislation, the author recommends that Serbian courts consider adopting a model of collective redress based on the assignment of multiple claims to a designated body, similar to the German system.
Jelena Vukadinović Marković (Wed,) studied this question.