This study investigates the rationale behind North Korean dictators’ use of seemingly contradictory forms of military control—influence and domination—to solidify regime stability during periods of power transition. In this analysis, North Korean dictators are assumed to navigate their decision-making within the constraints of existing institutional structures. Unlike Kim Jong-Il (KJI), who could capitalize on the established “old boy network” comprised of his predecessor’s military protégés, Kim Jong-un (KJU) was compelled to replace this entrenched nepotism with bureaucratic regulations to consolidate his control over the military. Then, this study hypothesizes that dictators’ use of praise or threats toward the military reflects shifts in the network structure in which they are embedded. By tracing the career trajectories of 184 North Korean generals who held 55 key command and staff positions in the Korean People’s Army (KPA) from 1989 to 2023, this study examined how variations in loyalty norms and resulting network structures shaped the dictators’ speech to the military. Results from a structural topic modeling analysis show that KJI was more likely to speak on complimentary topics, while KJU was more likely to speak on reprimanding topics when addressing the KPA. These findings underscore how shifts in the military leadership network decide the distinct military control strategies employed by dictators.
Kim et al. (Fri,) studied this question.