Abstract Judicial independence has become a central benchmark within the European Union’s rule-of-law and enlargement framework, particularly for candidate countries in the Western Balkans. Albania represents a distinctive case, as its 2016 constitutional reform introduced one of the most comprehensive judicial vetting processes in Europe. This reform re-established core governance institutions while simultaneously testing their resilience under conditions of significant capacity strain. The aim of this study is to examine how the European Commission evaluated judicial independence in Albania between 2020 and 2024 and to interpret these evaluations within broader comparative and theoretical contexts. The study employs a qualitative content analysis of the European Commission’s annual Albania Reports (2020–2024), identifying key thematic clusters within the rule-of-law chapters and tracing the evolution of evaluative language related to independence, accountability, and institutional functionality. The findings reveal a largely stable narrative: although Albania’s institutional design is consistently assessed as aligned with European standards, judicial independence remains functionally fragile. This fragility is primarily attributed to vetting-related personnel depletion, delayed judicial appointments, and resource-driven inefficiencies. In contrast to the politically motivated patterns of interference observed in Poland and Hungary, Albania’s vulnerabilities stem from systemic strain and limited administrative capacity rather than overt political capture. Situating these findings within contemporary scholarship on EU conditionality and judicial governance, the analysis argues that judicial independence can be consolidated only through predictable career management, sustainable budgeting, and the depoliticized functioning of judicial councils. The study concludes that Albania’s principal challenge lies not in achieving legal conformity but in translating its reform architecture into durable institutional practice, thereby embedding judicial independence as a routine operational norm rather than an externally monitored aspiration.
Erjona Bezatlliu (Thu,) studied this question.