Abstract In a semi-presidential system, which is the most common regime type in Europe, a separately elected president shares executive powers with the government. This dual-executive model incentivizes conflicts that reduce the capacity for effective decision-making. Alongside constitutional rules, the intraexecutive power balance is conditioned by informal practices in response to public opinion. Increasing public demand for a more powerful presidential role can thus ‘presidentialize’ dual executives. Utilizing novel survey data from Finland, we examine the factors that condition support for a stronger presidency. Relative to the country’s highly institutionalized and strongly government-driven political system, we find substantial support for a formally stronger and more confrontational presidency. This support is systematically connected with the typical features of a populist electorate (such as, for example, distrust in political institutions, male voters and ‘populist’ concerns) and we demonstrate that such respondents are also more willing to reduce the powers of parliamentary institutions. The strengthening of such attitudes can potentially destabilize semi-presidential regimes.
Koskimaa et al. (Thu,) studied this question.
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