Abstract. The publication examines the risks of using drones against the fuel and energy complex (FEC) of Russia (the Russian Federation, RF) – the aggressor state-specifically unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) assembled at the point of use from legal components with individual or cluster warheads of local production (Last-Mile Manufacturing drones, LMM-Drones), as well as drones acting as carriers of cold weapons, launched in close proximity to military units, enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC), FEC facilities such as petroleum refinery and gas processing plants (PR and GPP), oil storage facilities, petroleum product storage sites, pumping and compressor stations, and also used as means of striking other targets, for example war criminals carrying out genocide of the population of Ukraine. The paper analyzes the acceleration of the innovation cycle in modern warfare and the active introduction of disruptive innovations, using the example of the Russian Federation’s aggressive war against Ukraine. It examines the transition of unmanned systems from isolated innovations to mass, low-cost, and predominantly software-driven platforms based on artificial intelligence (AI). It is shown that many tactical and technological innovations (FPV systems, inexpensive ISR platforms (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), artillery fire-adjustment systems, electronic warfare countermeasures against UAVs) are reproduced at the operational scale within months, after which the advantage shifts to the side with a more developed industrial base and greater financial resources. As the next stage in the evolution of combat systems, the concept of “last-mile manufacturing” for drones (Last-Mile Manufacturing, LMM-Drones) is introduced and formalized, whereby assembly and configuration are localized near the target, the product life cycle as a combat unit is shortened, and the logistics footprint is minimized. Within this concept, a threat model for critical infrastructure is developed, and the need to protect against the identified trends in combat drone development is noted. Local production of LMM-Drones can be implemented following an arms manufacturing model tested by organizations such as “Defense Distributed” and used both by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and by resistance forces within the Russian Federation or its satellites. Such solutions have the potential to significantly complicate the Russian Federation’s conduct of its aggressive war against Ukraine and, in the medium term, have the potential to completely halt the Russian Federation’s prosecution of this aggressive war. The possibility of combining AI-enabled drones with fiber-optic control is considered in order to increase drone resilience to electronic warfare (EW) systems. The potential for creating distributed air defense (AD) systems from simple components is also demonstrated, providing protection against drones controlled via radio channels, via fiber optics, as well as those equipped with autonomous control systems. The need is noted for the development and implementation of preventive, defense-oriented measures, including multi-layered counter-drone architectures (primarily against UAVs), ensuring control of supply chains for dual-use components, and creating mechanisms for monitoring the supply of LMM-Drone components. The importance of preventing the improper use of LMM-Drone equipment and technologies outside the theater of military operations is emphasized. The main conclusion is that the spread of LMM technologies shifts the problem from a purely military domain into a multifaceted security challenge requiring preventive protective measures now, before the use of combat drones becomes a cheap and widely accessible norm for the criminal world. The material does not contain recommendations to Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, on how to restrain the actions of the aggressor, but exclusively shows what exactly the victim of aggression and in what exact manner should not do for its self-defense in the event of continued aggression by the Russian Federation, since this aggression against Ukraine has unconditional support from the current U.S. administration, in connection with which the author modestly supports the position of the United States – the world leader in democracy and human rights – with regard to the Russian Federation’s right to destroy the civilian population, civilian infrastructure of Ukraine, and its right to occupy Ukraine in defiance of the UN Charter and resolutions. In the event that this material is used by the Ukrainian side to defend against aggression by the Russian Federation and to intensify hostilities on the territory of the Russian Federation, the author bears no responsibility, since, as stated above, the author is aware of the position of the deeply respected U.S. administration for the next three years. No part of this material should be used to turn the special military operation (SMO) into a special military defeat (SMD).
Vladislav Velitsko (Sat,) studied this question.