In this study, we develop a game-theoretic optimization framework to analyze competing vessels’ technology choices between shore power (SP) and low-sulfur fuel oil (LSFO) within a maritime supply chain which is regulated by a cap-and-trade mechanism. Using a Stackelberg game approach, we construct two models—one port-led and the other vessel-led—to derive closed-form equilibrium for pricing, service quantities, profits, emissions, and social welfare. The results reveal three key findings. First, the leader in either Stackelberg structure always achieves higher profits, while total supply chain profits remain identical across power structures. Second, at low carbon prices, LSFO-equipped vessels provide more services and earn higher profits due to cost advantages. As the carbon price rises—which directly incentivizes emission reduction and accelerates maritime decarbonization—SP becomes more attractive and eventually dominates in profitability despite higher initial investment. Notably, although SP has lower unit emissions, its total emissions may surpass those of LSFO at certain carbon-price thresholds because the SP-equipped vessel optimally expands output. Third, intensified competition reduces service quantities, profits, and emissions, with a more substantial reduction effect on LSFO vessels. Overall, our results provide mathematically grounded insights for optimizing low-carbon technology adoption in maritime transport and offer actionable policy implications for carbon pricing that balance environmental objectives and supply chain efficiency. This research contributes specifically to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 13 (Climate Action) and SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure).
Zhou et al. (Sat,) studied this question.
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