From Temperament to Architecture

William James’s The Will to Believe (1896) treats epistemic life as a psychological drama between two introspectively accessible imperatives: “Believe truth!” and “Shun error!” This paper argues that such psychology‑centric epistemology cannot capture the dynamics of modern epistemic systems. Using the Epistemic Polarity Framework (EPF), Forced‑Position Framing (FPF), and Supra‑Agency Theory (SAT), we show that epistemic aims are not products of individual temperament or voluntary commitment but are imposed by the structural constraints of epistemic architectures. Transparency Epistemics (TE) structurally enforces an error‑avoidant posture, while Opacity Epistemics (OE) structurally enforces a compliance‑oriented posture. These architectural priorities are not introspectively accessible to agents operating within them. James’s voluntaristic model therefore mislocates epistemic agency: it assumes that psychological introspection can reveal the forces shaping epistemic life, when in fact those forces operate at a level that introspection cannot reach. Architectural Epistemics thus exposes a layer of epistemic determination that classical, psychology‑centric epistemology is structurally incapable of describing.