This report analyzes the policy (in)coherences in the regulatory design between the European Union Regulation on Deforestation-free products (EUDR), as a case of a unilateral transnational environmental trade regulation, and three national public policies (i.e., the national public forest laws of Brazil, Cameroon and Gabon) and three hybrid public-private governance mechanisms (i.e., Brazilian Amazon Soy Moratorium, Cameroon FLEGT-VPA and Gabon Mandatory FSC Certification) from key non-EU producer countries (i.e., Brazil, Cameroon, and Gabon). The regulatory design of these selected regulations represents a variety of existing domestic mechanisms that, albeit having similar goals, may be impacted by the EUDR’s implementation. They were evaluated based on the conceptual nature of interaction (i.e., coordination, cooptation, competition, chaos) of their policy goals, regulatory standards and enforcement mechanisms.Results show that the EUDR was found to be coherent and coordinated with all selected policies and governance mechanisms in terms of their overarching policy goals (e.g., forest protection) and some implementation and enforcement mechanisms (e.g., similar tools and strategies). However, incoherence is evident in the form of cooptation and competition in some specific goals, regulatory standards and certain implementation and enforcement mechanisms. The report thus underscores that EUDR standards can impact producing countries in more subtle ways than the most commonly anticipated (e.g., sovereignty, costs, market leakage). Governance strategies already underway in some countries (e.g., public policies and private arrangements), including those promoted by other EU regulations (i.e., FLEGT-VPA), can be impacted and delegitimized by the EUDR through cooptation and/or competition among requirements. This finding is a key consideration when assessing the EUDR's future effectiveness in its overarching goal of reducing global deforestation and forest degradation. Despite analyzing (in)coherences by regulatory design, de-facto (in)coherences will depend on the EUDR's implementation and enforcement, such as behavioral reactions by target actors on the demand (i.e., EU) and supply (e.g., Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon) side. The report provides crucial insights for the design of transnational socio-environmental policies. Policy coherence and alignment between the EU and national producer country policies are needed to avoid creating regulatory fragmentation, differing standards, implementation and enforcement uncertainties, and delegitimization of current standards and processes.
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Rafaella Ferraz Ziegert
University of Freiburg
Laila Berning
Mathias Cramm
University of Bonn
University of Freiburg
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Ziegert et al. (Fri,) studied this question.
synapsesocial.com/papers/699a9e9f482488d673cd4d7e — DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18711732