This study aims to examine the mechanisms of legal reconfiguration of Korean forced mobilization under the Ministry of Munitions system during the final stages of the Asia-Pacific War. It also elucidates the structure and nature of corporate policy involvement throughout this process. While existing scholarship has predominantly depicted the expansion of forced mobilization as a unilateral state response to the deteriorating war situation, this study empirically analyzes the internal Ministry of Munitions documents and Cabinet decisions to delineate the specific pathways through which corporate demands and interests were institutionalized into national mobilization legislation. The findings reveal that the Munitions Companies Act and the Ministry of Munitions Regulations of 1943 granted corporate executives quasi-bureaucratic status and authority, notably as “Participants.” Leveraging this position, munitions companies embedded within the ministry’s organizational structure consistently asserted the institutional necessity for large-scale forced mobilization by presenting “quantified labor demands” meticulously calculated from production targets and personnel deficits. Further, this corporate involvement was codified into mobilization laws through a process wherein proposals submitted by the Ministry of Munitions were ratified by the Cabinet “as requested,” without substantive revision. Ultimately, this study demonstrates that the legal reconfiguration of Korean forced mobilization from 1944 constituted the culmination of corporate power institutionally converging with state legislation via the Ministry of Munitions system. This analysis offers a critical reappraisal of the “passive cooperation” narrative maintained by Japanese firms in the postwar era, reconsidering accountability through a legal-historical lens focused on proactive corporate involvement and the institutionalization of the legal framework.
경자 강 (2026) studied this question.