Purpose This study investigates how perceptions of social, economic and political inequalities influence tax compliance attitudes in Ghana. It further examines whether trust in government, perceived governance quality, and perceived corruption moderate these relationships. Design/methodology/approach The study utilises data from Round 9 of the Afrobarometer survey, comprising 2,369 respondents in Ghana. The data were analysed using partial least squares structural equation modelling. Findings Perceived economic, social and political inequality each significantly reduces tax-compliance attitudes, confirming that fairness concerns strongly shape compliant behaviour. However, the moderating effects differ from theoretical dimensions. Trust in government intensifies, rather than weakens, the negative effect of economic inequality, suggesting that high-trust citizens react more strongly when fairness expectations are violated. Governance quality does not moderate the impact of social inequality, and corruption does not moderate any inequality-compliance pathway. The results indicate that inequality exerts a consistent negative influence on compliance, and institutional factors operate as independent predictors rather than buffers. Research limitations/implications Using only data from Ghana may limit generalisability of the findings, since citizens' perception may differ from objective measures of services, inequality, and corruption across countries. Practical implications The findings highlight that building trust or improving governance quality alone is insufficient when inequality remains salient. Tax administrators should prioritise reducing perceived unfairness through transparent procedures, equitable service delivery, predictable enforcement and meaningful avenues for redress. Strengthening routine governance processes is likely to yield stronger compliance gains than standalone anti-corruption or trust-building campaigns. Originality/value This study contributes novel evidence by showing that institutional trust can amplify the negative effects of inequality and that governance quality and corruption do not condition inequality–compliance relationships as theory predicts. By integrating relative deprivation, fairness and slippery slope perspectives, the study provides a refined understanding of how inequality and institutional contexts jointly shape tax compliance, offering actionable insights for policy and compliance strategies in sub-Saharan Africa.
Jones Adjei Ntiamoah (Fri,) studied this question.