This paper introduces Existential Realism as a novel ontological framework in metaphysics, offering a rigorous alternative to presentism. Rather than equating reality with what exists in the present,1 Existential Realism distinguishes existence—material, empirically accessible presence—from reality, which also encompasses causal traces, knowledge structures, and anticipated possibilities beyond the immediate now. This framework integrates insights from metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology to address the limitations of presentism and related theories of time. We delineate how Existential Realism departs from presentism (and is not merely a variant thereof) by reinterpreting what it means for an entity or event to exist now, while still affirming the ontological significance of past and future entities as real despite their lack of present existence. Systematic comparisons are drawn between Existential Realism and the standard theories of temporal ontology – presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory – with references to key contributors (Markosian, Crisp, Bourne, Zimmerman) to highlight differences in ontological commitments. We provide technically grounded examples—from causal traces in physics to cognitive-state evidence and time-indexed data structures—to show how entities can be real even without presently existing. The paper also addresses major objections, including the coherence of reality without existence, the epistemological access to entities that do not presently exist or are unobservable, and the compatibility of this framework with special relativity. A comparative table is included to map Existential Realism vis-à-vis other theories. In conclusion, Existential Realism is presented as a robust, integrative stance that preserves the empirical and experiential centrality of the present while acknowledging the enduring reality of the past and the looming reality of the future – thus serving as a stand-alone reference framework for future discourse in metaphysics and cognitive science. 1 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presentism/#:~:text=instance%2C%20neatly%20articulates%20this%20apparent,mainstream%20characterisation
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Tenzin C. Trepp
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Tenzin C. Trepp (Wed,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69a67ee0f353c071a6f0a658 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18822356