Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) require authentication systems that balance privacy, scalability, and post-quantum security. While lattice-based V-LDAA offers quantum resistance, it faces challenges in signature size, traceability, and integration. We propose post-quantum traceable direct anonymous attestation (PQ-TDAA), combining National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standard Dilithium2 and Falcon-512 signatures with adapted Beullens-style blind signatures and Fiat–Shamir simplified Schnorr proofs, reducing proof size by 69.2% (8 kB vs. V-LDAA’s 26 kB) and supporting European Telecommunications Standards Institute Technical Specification (ETSI TS) 102 941-compliant traceability through Road Side Unit (RSU)-assisted verification. Evaluated using SageMath, Python 3.11, and NS-3, PQ-TDAA-Falcon-512 achieves 8.1 ms and 49.7 ms end-to-end delays at 10 and 20 vehicles, respectively, with 64.7 Mbps goodput on congested 802.11p channels, showing promise for densities of ≤50 vehicles and advantages over Dilithium2. Real-world validation on ARM Cortex-A76 (Raspberry Pi 5, emulating automotive OBUs) yields sub-0.5 ms V2V cycles within 100 ms beacon intervals, supporting practical embedded deployment. Future work will extend PQ-TDAA to emerging 5G and NR-V2X settings, integrate more realistic mobility and channel models through coupled NS-3 and SUMO co-simulation, and investigate side-channel resistance for enhanced scalability and robustness in real deployments.
Agustina et al. (Mon,) studied this question.