This article integrates three apparently incompatible theoretical frameworks: Gould’s (2002) multilevel evolutionary hierarchy, Okasha’s (2024) distinction between organizational and selection hierarchies, and gene-centered memetic theory applied to law (Lerer, 2025). I argue that (1) type 2 multilevel selection (MLS2) lacks causal microfoundations when applied to legal systems; (2) higher-level emergent effects are real but operate as downward constraints, not as selection units; and (3) the Constitutional Lock-in Index 3.0 (CLI 3.0) mathematically formalizes these constraints through the Birkhoff polytope. Preliminary empirical validation with six Latin American countries (1983–2025) shows that CLI 3.0 discriminates successful from failed regimes with 78% accuracy. The analysis reconciles Dawkins’s rejection of group selection with Gould’s recognition of irreducible macroevolutionary processes, providing quantitative foundations for comparative institutional analysis.
Ignacio Adrian LERER (Mon,) studied this question.