Abstract Modern targeting doctrine permits the foreseeable killing of ascertainable civilians provided the harm can be characterized as ‘unintended’ and ‘not excessive’. This article argues that existing international humanitarian law, properly interpreted, already prohibits such harm where feasible alternatives exist. It articulates the Principle of Foreseeable Harm to Innocents (FHI): a doctrinal standard, grounded in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, that interposes an ‘avoidability gate’ between the identification of a military objective and proportionality analysis. Attacks may not proceed against foreseeable civilian risk until the attacking authority has demonstrated that no feasible alternative could eliminate or substantially reduce the harm. The framework builds on Ohlin’s defence of the intent/foresight distinction, Crawford’s analysis of systemic collateral damage, Shue’s capacity-indexed account of legal obligation, and Lewis’s operational research on civilian harm detection failures. The article addresses tactical and operational targeting decisions—planned strikes where decision-makers have time to assess civilian presence and consider alternatives—not political decisions preceding armed conflict nor dynamic engagements where reaction time forecloses deliberation. The central contribution is methodological: shifting legal inquiry from reconstruction of subjective intention to verification of objective alternatives. Enforcement examines what the commander knew and what alternatives existed, not mental states. This aligns with Article 57’s capacity-indexed structure, drafted to expand precautionary obligations as technological capability increases. FHI does not supplant proportionality; it ensures proportionality addresses only genuinely unavoidable harm. By anchoring legality in verifiable facts, FHI offers a doctrinally grounded mechanism for addressing foreseeable, avoidable harm to ascertainable civilians in deliberative targeting.
Neil Cameron (Thu,) studied this question.