State-owned enterprises in Zambia operate within a complex nexus of formal governance frameworks and informal political economies. The persistent underperformance and financial distress of these entities suggest a significant divergence between theoretical governance models and their practical implementation, necessitating an in-depth, contextual investigation. This study aims to ethnographically deconstruct the lived realities of corporate governance within selected SOEs, specifically examining how formal governance structures interact with, and are often subverted by, networks of state patronage. A multi-sited organisational ethnography was conducted, employing prolonged immersion, participant observation, and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with board members, senior executives, ministry officials, and trade union representatives across three major SOEs. Analysis reveals that formal board authority is systematically circumvented by a parallel, informal governance system driven by political patronage. A predominant theme was the 'board as a rubber stamp', where over 70% of interviewed board members reported that strategically significant procurement and appointment decisions were pre-determined through political channels outside the official governance structure. The efficacy of imported corporate governance codes is severely limited by entrenched patrimonial systems. Governance reform in this context is less a technical challenge and more a deeply political one, requiring engagement with the underlying socio-political logic. Reform initiatives should prioritise the insulation of CEO and board chair appointments from direct political patronage. Developing hybrid governance models that formally acknowledge and regulate the state's role as a dominant shareholder, rather than pretending its influence is absent, is critical. Corporate governance, state-owned enterprises, patronage, ethnography, Zambia, political economy, boards of directors This paper provides a novel, empirically rich 'view from the boardroom', demonstrating how patronage networks operationalise control, thereby offering a new micro-level mechanism explaining the failure of macro-level governance reforms in emerging African economies.
Banda et al. (Fri,) studied this question.