Humanitarian Protection for Prisoners of War and Refugees in the Long Aftermath of the First World War. By FrancescaPiana. Leiden University Press, 2024.278 pp. Free open access / €117 (hardback).

The period after the end of the First World War marked a formative stage in the development of humanitarian care for prisoners of war and refugees. Faced with hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals, most of them in the former Tsarist Empire and the new states of Central and Eastern Europe, international organizations – including as the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – began to develop mechanisms and principles that would shape humanitarian action throughout the twentieth century. Francesca Piana's book uses three interconnected case studies to trace these developments and highlights the dynamics and tensions that shaped them. The first examines the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war (POWs) after 1918. This process was particularly complicated, as many former Russian soldiers were unwilling to return for political reasons or because they belonged to national minorities seeking independence from the former Tsarist Empire. Yet, the presence of approximately half a million former POWs put a significant economic strain on Germany and other former Central Powers, which they were increasingly unable to cope with. It was at this point that international organizations stepped in to facilitate humanitarian relief and orderly repatriation. The POW camp in the Estonian city of Narva became a key hub for these activities. As Piana highlights, neither military commanders nor humanitarian actors such as the Red Cross had sufficient experience in dealing with such large numbers of displaced people, many of whom were stuck in Narva. The situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of typhoid and cholera due to the abysmal hygiene in the camp. No European country was willing to offer permanent resettlement, yet the Russian Civil War also meant that there were no authorities on the Russian side that would be able to take responsibility for the POWs. Much of the actual relief work depended on prominent individuals who could often use their personal connections to facilitate aid deliveries to Narva. The most prominent among them was certainly the Norwegian Arctic explorer, Fridtjof Nansen, who was appointed High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921. As Piana explains, Nansen was a great public champion of refugee relief but proved difficult to work with on a day-to-day basis. Nansen often acted on his own initiative, which caused tensions with other humanitarian actors. Ultimately, however, some 427,886 former POWs were successfully repatriated, 406,091 through Narva alone. The second case study directly relates to the first. The Russian Civil War (1918–22) triggered several waves of refugees, in its later stages, particularly those of ‘White’ emigres and armed formations. The chaotic evacuation of the c. 150,000 troops and followers of General Denikin in March and April 1920 to Constantinople on British ships is just one case in point. The presence of such large numbers of refugees, with Denikin's troops still under arms, posed a significant challenge to the Allied powers who occupied Constantinople at the time. A key concern was feeding and caring for displaced civilians, who also faced hostility from the local population. Yet, there were also concerns about Russian refugees as a factor in geopolitical instability. As Piana argues, this helps to explain why, for instance, the ILO became involved in refugee work. Although ostensibly not within the organization's scope, the ILO provided expertise and support for the resettlement of Russian refugees, in some cases to Central and South America, by classifying them as displaced skilled workers seeking employment. These resettlement schemes were embraced by some national governments, yet often also had detrimental effects on the indigenous workers. The ILO's leadership, however, was often more concerned with the potentially destabilizing impact of the influx of refugees on European countries. The third case study then examines the humanitarian relief for the survivors of the Armenian genocide. By 1918, there were at least 250,000 displaced Armenian survivors, who found themselves in the former Russian parts of the Caucasus and in Eastern Anatolia. Their humanitarian situation was dire, with tens of thousands facing severe malnutrition and starvation. Relief efforts were further hampered by the political instability in the nascent Turkish state and the complicated implementation of the League of Nations’ mandates system. Piana emphasizes the role of the Armenian diaspora in putting pressure on the British and French governments to facilitate the resettlement and humanitarian relief for the Armenian refugees. It was again the involvement of Nansen, particularly on behalf of child survivors, and the publicity that came with it, which led to more substantial interventions and coordination between the different actors. All three case studies demonstrate vividly just how uncharted the territory of large-scale humanitarian relief was at the time. There were virtually no practical experiences, even within established organizations such as the ICRC, with delivering humanitarian aid, nor were there established structures, mechanisms and organizations. Instead, much depended on individual commitments, such as Fridtjof Nansen's, and on the improvisation and experimentation on the ground. Ultimately, this led, over time, to the professionalization of humanitarian aid. Experts became increasingly involved, for instance, in determining the nutritional needs of refugees and the most efficient distribution of aid. Yet Piana also argues that the historical context of geopolitical instability after the First World War, the nascent international order of the interwar period with its new international organizations and the fear of communism and revolution all shaped humanitarian responses. Refugees were not just seen as destitute individuals in need of aid, but also as a potential source of instability and unrest. Piana explains in great depth the complex relationship between genuine humanitarian concerns and these political anxieties. If there is a criticism of her book, perhaps it is that its focus remains almost exclusively on organizational and political problems. The reader learns very little about the actual delivery of humanitarian aid on the ground. There are some well-placed anecdotes throughout the book that shed some light on the issue, but the perspective of the refugees and POWs themselves is mostly absent. Overall, however, this does not diminish the contribution of the study to our better understanding of this crucial period in the history of humanitarianism.