The influence of institutional investors in myopic R&D investment behavior.

Abstract This paper examines whether institutional investors create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (RD) to meet short-term earnings goats. Many critics argue that the frequent trading and short-term focus of institutional investors encourages managers to engage in such myopic investment behavior Others argue that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutions allow managers to focus on long-term value rather than on short-term earnings. I examine these competing views by testing whether institutional ownership affects RD spending for firms that could reverse a decline in earnings with a reduction in RD. The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut RD to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions are sophisticated investors who typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behavior However, I find that a large proportion of ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover arid engage in momentum trading significantly increases the probability that managers reduce RD to reverse an earnings decline. These results indicate that high turnover and momentum trading by institutional investors encourages myopic investment behavior when such institutional investors have extremely high levels of ownership in a firm; otherwise, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment behavior.