Halting violence in times of disaster: ceasefire declarations and rebel capabilities

Abstract When large disasters hit regions with ongoing armed conflict, rebel groups sometimes assist affected populations, either by allowing external aid inflows or by providing relief themselves. Rebel groups may also initiate ceasefires to stop fighting in the immediate aftermath of the disasters temporarily. In this paper, we propose that such ceasefires do not necessarily represent the first step to conflict resolution or cooperation, but can also be declared because they allow strategic regrouping and an opportunity to increase or regain rebel group capabilities. We outline two theoretical explanations for why insurgents would want to declare a ceasefire after an external shock, such as a disaster. First, when insurgents are set back materially by a disaster, declaring a ceasefire provides time to regroup and strengthen material capabilities. Second, if rebel groups are service providers in disaster-affected areas, declaring a truce will also be important to maintain public support, enhancing non-material capabilities. We test our theoretical framework with a difference-in-difference strategy comparing the likelihood of ceasefire declarations after disasters, depending on whether the disaster occurred in the conflict zone or somewhere else in the country. We find that the likelihood of rebel-induced ceasefires is higher in the immediate aftermath of disasters, and particularly when disasters occur in conflicts where insurgents provide education services.