Beyond the 'Woman' Problem: Towards a Truly Trans Feminist Theory and Politics

For over half a century, major theoretical debates in feminist philosophy have centred around what is known as the ‘woman problem’. Given the lack of discernible unifying criteria, coupled with significant challenges posed by the arguments from normativity, diversity, particularity, complexity, and non-separability (Stoljar, 2011), the category ‘Woman’ appears increasingly unviable. Yet a fundamental assumption of the field posits that such a category is essential for feminist mobilisation. This assumption is premised on the ideas that feminism’s primary goal is to ‘end the sexist oppression of women’ (Haslanger, 2012) and that gender categories are needed to theorise about—and address—broad patterns of oppression privileging men over women. As a result, since the 1960s, much feminist philosophical work has focused on defining the boundaries of 'Woman'. This task is further complicated by the requirement that any acceptable theory of gender be ‘intersectional’ (Mikkola, 2016). This means that any formulation of a unified category ‘Woman’ must avoid the problematic exclusion of individuals who belong within it. Ultimately, despite decades of work, feminist philosophy continues to grapple with an elusive category ‘Woman’ and its undesirable implications for feminist politics.In this thesis, I argue that the assumption that 'Woman' is essential to feminism and understanding gender-based oppression is unfounded. I further argue that these assumptions are driven by an unexamined cissexist bias that centres cisheterosexual perspectives and meaning-making. This theoretical impasse can be resolved by abandoning gender categories and considering viable non-category-based alternative theories of gender. I develop such a theory in my Non-paradigmatic Account of Gender, which centres the social individual in gender theory instead of identity categories. I argue that not only can we theorise oppression without unifying explanations, but that achieving gender justice requires centring specificity in our analyses of oppression and privilege. I ground such an analysis in the concepts of the Masculine Ideal and the Feminine Ideal, which I introduce as substitutes for the conventional categories of ‘Man’ and ‘Woman’ in traditional gender theory. Additionally, I use free-floating signifiers of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, as conceptualised in critical gender studies, to draw nuanced and inclusive interpretations of gender-based oppression that go beyond a simplistic ‘men are privileged and women oppressed’ analysis. Finally, I argue for a shift in focus from the ‘emancipation of women’ to ‘gender justice’ as feminism’s explicitly stated goal. Moving our focus away from the gender category and towards gender-based injustice expands the purview of feminist inquiry and politics, allowing for an inclusive and intersectional approach that has been our aim. Ultimately, I outline a normative moral principle grounded in my account of gender that can guide feminist activism towards being truly trans feminist.In the current political climate, the theory of gender I offer has the potential to bridge the historically fraught relationship between feminism and transgender theory, politics, and activism.