ABSTRACT This article investigates the manifestation and drivers of the fragmentation of inter‐state cooperation in submarine cable governance, and analyzes China's strategic positioning within this landscape. It argues that the fragmentation is manifested in both forms and agendas. On one hand, the fragmentation stems from the interplay of a state's calculus of willingness and capacity to cooperate, which gives rise to a spectrum of cooperative outcomes ranging from binding hard law to noncooperation. These outcomes are empirically validated by Singapore's practices. On the other hand, the fragmentation is also influenced by the unique geographic, commercial, public, and strategic attributes of the cables themselves. China's engagement in submarine cable governance presents a paradox. Despite its stature as a digital power, its achievements are limited. This is constrained internally by conflicting willingness and insufficient capacity, and externally by geopolitical exclusion and partner scarcity. Consequently, the article proposes that China's viable path forward is a pragmatic strategy of “managed participation,” which entails domestic regulatory reform, tiered international engagement, and the leveraging of its commercial and technical prowess to navigate the entrenched geopolitical competition. The resolution of the complex governance fragmentation will contribute to the safety and resilience of submarine cables and international connectivity.
Wenlong Zhu (Tue,) studied this question.