This study proposes a unified theoretical framework for understanding intelligence and intuition as differential dynamics of consciousness. Rather than treating them as distinct cognitive faculties or separate psychological systems, the model conceptualizes both as dynamic properties emerging from the same underlying process: the temporal evolution of consciousness itself. In this framework, intelligence corresponds to the first derivative of consciousness, reflecting the system’s adaptive response to imbalances in lived experience, whereas intuition corresponds to the second derivative, indicating moments where the dynamics of consciousness undergo a qualitative shift that allows a reconfiguration of meaning. The model introduces a mathematical formalism in which consciousness is represented as a function of subjective lived time, physiological state, integrated memory, and individual psychic sensitivity. The first derivative describes adaptive cognitive mobilization in response to temporal displacement from the present, while the second derivative captures points of inflection corresponding to genuine intuitive insight. These dynamics are interpreted through mathematical, biological, clinical, and philosophical perspectives. The study further explores the impact of contemporary algorithmic environments on the internal dynamics of consciousness. Continuous digital stimulation is modeled as high-frequency low-amplitude noise, leading to unstable derivatives, hyper-reactive intelligence, and the emergence of pseudo-intuitions lacking durable cognitive integration. This framework suggests that algorithmic environments do not destroy consciousness itself but disrupt its differential structure, preventing stable transitions between cognitive regimes. Finally, the study proposes an ethical and philosophical perspective centered on the concept of cognitive slowness, arguing that intuition requires temporal continuity, relative silence, and dynamic stability. The model thus offers an interdisciplinary approach for interpreting cognitive effort, intuitive insight, and the fragmentation of attention in contemporary technological environments. This article is an English version of a study originally written and published in French. The present translation is intended to make the work accessible to a broader international audience while preserving the conceptual structure of the original research.
Adel Ben Mabrouk (Fri,) studied this question.