Electoral Competitiveness and Social Conflicts in Peru

Conventional arguments posit that the quality of institutional representation influences the likelihood of non-institutional political participation, such as street protests. What aspect of institutional quality matters, however, is underexplored. This study considers electoral competitiveness a crucial aspect of democratic representation and empirically assesses whether it mitigates social conflicts in Peru. Democratic principles hold that competitive elections motivate representatives to serve better for electorates because doing so increases their chance of electoral success. Notwithstanding, there are reasons to be uncertain about this conjecture, particularly regarding social conflicts. Social conflicts, defined as local demand-making through public manifestations mostly deploying non-violent repertoire, take their origins in various demands unattended by institutional channels, and authorities facing more intensive competition are supposed to address them more effectively. However, scholars may suggest that some authorities who afford abundant resources to buy a greater margin of electoral support than rivals--following the rentier state model--may enjoy less competitive situations and fewer conflicts. In Peru, social conflicts are rampant, and subnational authorities may receive massive financial resources. Using department-level data from 2006 to 2020, I confirm that the smaller margin of votes obtained by two top contenders for governorship is associated with fewer social conflicts under their mandates.