Constitutional identity, democracy, and illiberal change

Abstract This article argues that the descriptive and normative dimensions of the concept of constitutional identity sit in tension with both democracy and (il)liberalism. On the one hand, due to its conservative nature (i.e., its connection to the protection of certain, usually liberal, core constitutional content), constitutional identity shares some similarities with the doctrine of the historical constitution, which bring to the surface several potential democratic risks, in particular the possibility of eternalizing a series of principles that are considered to be the correct ones at a particular moment in time. On the other hand, constitutional identity plays different roles with regard to the protection of liberal values—even though the concept of constitutional identity itself may be neutral. To protect those values in a way consistent with the democratic ideal, the concept of constitutional identity needs to account for the possibility of democratic change. Changes in constitutional identity (including, perhaps, changes that are inconsistent with the liberal tradition) should be outside the scope of the constituted authorities but, we argue, not necessarily outside the scope of mechanisms that can reasonably be understood as facilitating the popular exercise of constituent power. The issues mentioned above, we argue, manifest both domestically and in the multilevel, post-sovereign setting provided by the European Union. They are exemplified in the way in which constitutional identity, as reflected in German jurisprudence, can be used—and has been used—to defend a domestic illiberal turn in other European jurisdictions.