This paper argues that a subject never coincides with the life it lives and that selfhood is therefore a later formation within a life first undergone without full possession. In this sense, the self is late to the life it lives. Infancy provides the decisive site of proof, it is life without self-possession, a mode of existence fully real before it can be gathered as selfhood. From this follows a broader phenomenological reversal. What is first is exposure, life reaching, forming, pressuring and altering the subject before it can be taken up as intelligible world. Selfhood is therefore belated, reconstructive and incomplete. On this basis, objectivity must also be rethought, not as primitive givenness, but as the later scaffolding through which lives that cannot fully gather themselves from within alone become stateable, durable and revisable beyond one subject.
Musevver Ugursal (Sat,) studied this question.