This paper reinterprets contemporary globalization as a system of global productive coordination enabled by the ICT revolution, rather than a simple extension of neoclassical trade theory. It argues that the expansion of global value chains (GVCs) during 1990–2008 increased productivity through international fragmentation of production, but also generated internal distributive tensions. The 2008 financial crisis is identified as a political-institutional rupture that transformed these tensions into nationalism, protectionism, and fragmentation of global cooperation. The paper develops a causal mechanism linking globalization, crisis, populism, tariffs, and declining trade dynamism, and integrates migration as an endogenous outcome of disrupted global production. A game-theoretic framework shows the existence of two global equilibria: a cooperative equilibrium with high productivity and stability, and a non-cooperative equilibrium characterized by fragmentation, lower growth, and increased migratory pressure. A differentiated development architecture is proposed: a “global Marshall Plan” for very poor countries and endogenous industrial strategies for middle-income countries, both dependent on access to markets and technology. The analysis is normatively grounded in the Economy of Belonging, which evaluates globalization in terms of growth, distribution, and social cohesion. This work contributes to the literature by reframing globalization as an institutional and coordination problem, integrating political economy, development theory, and game theory into a unified framework.
Carlos Federico Obregon Diaz (Thu,) studied this question.