Purpose This paper aims to examine how multinational enterprises minimise tax liabilities in emerging economies through lawful but engineered cross border structures. Using Rawlsian distributive justice, it assesses whether international tax rules and court responses protect the least advantaged by preventing tax base erosion that reduces funding for essential public services. It also examines how professional intermediaries enable complexity and shape the legitimacy of the international tax order. Design/methodology/approach Doctrinal analysis of judgments from India, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa is combined with socio legal critique. The cases are mapped to four Rawls grounded assumptions on fairness, fragmentation, transparency and accountability. Findings The cases show repeatable avoidance mechanisms. In India, offshore restructuring treated a value shifting transfer as exempt. In Nigeria, layered group structures and joint venture operations complicated tax enforcement while harm litigation moved abroad. In Ghana, offshore routed payments reduced local scrutiny around public contracts. In South Africa, structured finance re-characterised interest as exempt dividends until challenged under anti avoidance rules. Across contexts, advisers and intermediaries supported opacity and individual accountability was limited. This increases pressure on low-income states with limited institutional capacity. Judicial reasoning shaped outcomes because purposive interpretation protected the tax base, whereas formalism accepted legal form and allowed base erosion that fails a Rawlsian fairness test. Research limitations/implications The focus on four jurisdictions limits generalisation but provides deep insight into ethical and legal asymmetries in global taxation. Practical implications Policymakers should adopt substance based anti-avoidance rules and enforce adviser duties, with promoter disclosure, sanctions and mutual assistance. Originality/value The study links Rawlsian justice to comparative case law and proposes UN reforms that target professional enablers of tax avoidance.
Adams et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
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